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Abstract 
The paper develops the issue of the evaluation of investment projects in the area of the national railway infrastructure solved 
within the research project. The research projects is focused on the evaluation of benefits connected with the increasing of the 
safety and the reliability of the railway infrastructure due to the realization of projects including investments into managing and 
security equipment. The paper is focused on the identification of the relation between the change of the level of security on the 
railway and the change of the number of occurrences on the railway. The methodology of the research consists in the analysis of 
the database of occurrences obtained from the sources of the Railway Infrastructure Administration, which includes 
approximately 1 000 occurrences annually per last ten years (2009 – 2018). The database includes detailed information about 
registered occurrences. The output of the partial part of the research is the identification of the relation between specific 
occurrence and its cause and the level of the security in the place of the origin of the occurrence. The results of the research will 
be consequently used for the evaluation of benefits connected with the increasing of the safety and the reliability of the railway. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper deals with partial results in the field of railway control and signaling equipment and is based on the 
research project „Evaluation of increased safety and reliability of railway infrastructure after its modernization or 
reconstruction” (acronym EVARAIL), which is focused on the evaluation of benefits associated with increasing the 
safety and reliability of the railway infrastructure as a result of the implementation of new construction projects or 
renovations involving also investments in control and signaling equipment. 
From the methodological point of view the paper is based on detailed analysis of the database of occurrences, 
which is for statistical purposes administrated by Czech Railway Infrastructure Administration (SŽDC). These 
occurrences are in the database classified into groups and sub-groups according to the character of their generation. 
The results of the research presented within the paper will be in next steps used for the purposes of the evaluation of 
the socio-economic impacts of occurrences on the society, which will be consequently included into the economic 
evaluation of the projects of the railway infrastructure of Czech Republic. 
2. Present state references 
The research presented in the paper is quite unique and is focused on the reaching of objectives defined within the 
research projects mentioned above, however in the past there were  carried out research activities in related areas. 
The research described by Johnsen and Veen (2013) is oriented on the risk assessment and resilience of critical 
communication infrastructure in railways, especially discusses “the significant findings of an extended risk 
assessment of the key communication infrastructure used in emergency communication in railways in Norway”. 
Resilience was explored as a strategy in the risk assessment to improve safety, security, and quality of service. The 
proactive approach to train control is the subject of the research of Thurston and coll. (2012), consequently the 
resource allocation decisions to reduce the risk on railway is solved by King (2016). 
3. Overview of partial types of railway control and signaling equipment in Czech Republic 
The railway control and signaling equipment can be defined as follows. „Railway control and signaling 
equipment is a set of technical devices and interfaces between them that contribute to the safety of railway operation. 
In particular, by controlling or replacing the activities of the railway staff in the management of rail transport and the 
operation of railway vehicles“ 
There are different types of railway control and signaling equipment, depending on location and situation: 
 Station-mounted control and signaling equipment, 
 Track-mounted control and signaling equipment,  
 Vehicle-mounted control and signaling equipment. 
3.1. Station-mounted control and signaling equipment 
Equipment for creating and ensuring conditions for safe train movement along a selected path in a station. There 
are 3 categories: 
 
1. Category – the simplest and least secure system:  
  The signals are not dependent on the position of the switches to be passed by the train. 
 The devices do not allow the exclusion of all concurrently prohibited train journeys. 
 Only the staff (e.g. dispatcher) is responsible for creating the train path and for the correct charging of switches. 
2. Category – (electro-) mechanical or electro-dynamic security system:  
 The signals are dependent on the position of the switches to be passed by the train (does not apply to shunting). 
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 The devices do allow the exclusion of all concurrently prohibited train journeys (does not apply to shunting). 
 No control of clearance of the train path. 
 
3. Category – relay or electronic security system: 
  The signals are dependent on the position of the switches to be passed by the train (also for shunting). 
 The devices do allow the exclusion of all concurrently prohibited train journeys (also for shunting). 
  Control of clearance of the train path. 
3.2. Track-mounted control and signaling equipment 
Equipment to ensure the secure movement of trains on the wide track between track sections or stations. It 
observes the running of following trains and eliminates the opposite running of trains (on single-track routes). There 
are also 3 categories: 
 
1. Category – the simplest and least secure system (e.g. telephone communication):  
  No control of clearance of the track section for following trains. 
  No control of opposite running of trains (on single-track routes). 
2. Category – (relay) semi-automatic block:  
  Partially control of clearance of the track section for following trains. 
  Control of opposite running of trains (on single-track routes). 
3. Category – bi-directional three-sign automatic block and automatic line block:  
  Control of clearance of the track section for following trains. 
  Control of opposite running of trains (on single-track routes). 
3.3. Vehicle-mounted control and signaling equipment 
Equipment to ensure the secure ride of the vehicle by checking the train driver of compliance with the limit 
parameters of train running. This is achieved by the so-called system LS (“Liniový Systém”, in English “Continuous 
System”). It is a cab signaling and train protection system, which continuously transmits and shows a signal aspect 
of the next main signal in driver's cabin. It also checks the driver's activity (e.g. reduction of train's speed) and his 
vigilance (by periodically pressing the “vigilance button“– else the emergency brake is applied). The trackside part 
of the LS-system is based on coded track circuits using carrier frequency 75 Hz combined with amplitude 
modulation (“on-off-keying”). There are used four modulation frequencies: 
  0.9 Hz – Red aspect: Demand to stop at the next signal; 
 1.8 Hz – Yellow annulus aspect: From the main signal and in the circumference of the switches adjacent to the 
signal, the train shall run at a reduced speed specified by a two-light signal including light bars and digits; 
 3.6 Hz – Yellow aspect: The nearest main signal shows WARNING or EXPECT SPEED with 100, 80, 60 or 40 
km/h; 
  5.4 Hz  – Green aspect: No speed restrictions at the next signal. 
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4. Methodology: Evaluation of the database 
The database, used as input for analysis, includes all occurrences recorded on the state railway infrastructure in 
the Czech Republic for the years 2009 to 2018. The database has a very complicated structure and includes a large 
amount of information on each occurrence. For easier orientation in the database of occurrences, the classification of 
occurrences has been adopted for the purpose of its analysis, which divides the occurrences into the following three 
groups: 
A – Serious accidents (A1 – A4), 
B – Accidents (B1 – B10), 
C – Incidents (C1 – C21). 
 
As can be seen from the above structure, each of the groups is further subdivided into sub-groups according to the 
specific nature of the occurrence. 
 
From the database, all the occurrences related to the railway control and signaling equipment were first filtered 
out, distinguished between infrastructure-mounted (caused by train dispatcher or signaler) and vehicle-mounted 
(caused by train driver) occurrences. It was only considered the human factor that means, no occurrences caused by 
technical defects or failures (e.g. power blackouts, failures of technical components), the analysis affect only 
occurrences related to stations when entering and leaving trains and line sections but no industrial tracks. 
Furthermore, no account was taken to occurrences involving railway crossings, as these are not part of the 
EVARAIL project. The occurrences in terms of infrastructure then were subdivided into the safety levels 1, 2 and 3. 
Since level 3 already allows the greatest possible safety, only the occurrences of level 1 and 2 were analyzed in 
detail, as here – at least in theory – the upgrading to a higher safety category (usually level 3, in rare cases level 2) 
would have been a possible prevention of specific type of occurrence.  
 
To make it clearer, some of the most common occurrences concerning human factor in this context are 
occurrences regarding the infrastructure signaling system and occurrences regarding the vehicle (basically caused by 
train driver). 
 
Occurrences regarding the infrastructure signaling system (basically caused by train dispatcher or signaler): 
  Unauthorized train departure, 
 Sending a train to a wrong (already occupied) track, 
 Wrongly charged switch, 
  Switch charging under the vehicle. 
Occurrences regarding the vehicle (basically caused by train driver): 
 Departure without an order to leave, 
 Disobeying a signal (e.g. specified maximum speed), 
  Passing the signal "Stop" (“red light”). 
5. Results 
The most important results related to the railway control and signaling equipment are summarized in the table 1. 
Table 1 Analysis of occurrences related to the railway control and signaling equipment of categories 1 and 2 
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B 2 2,543,937 0 2 0 2,543,937 0 
C 16 34,427 0 8 8 34,427 0 
Total 18 2,578,364 0 10 8 2,578,364 0 
2010 
C 20 68,916 16,208 13 7 44,470 40,654 
Total 20 68,916 16,208 13 7 44,470 40.654 
2011 
A 1 6,820,615 62,300 1 0 6,882,915 0 
C 24 2,489 249,046 11 13 188,950 62,585 
Total 25 6,823,104 311,346 12 13 7,071,865 62,585 
2012 
C 25 36,772 60,439 13 12 56,941 40,270 
Total 25 36,772 60,439 13 12 56,941 40,270 
2013 
B 1 730,958 3,605 1 0 734,563 0 
C 21 881,805 142,144 9 12 289,429 703,067 
Total 22 1,612,763 145,749 10 12 1,023,992 734,520 
2014 
C 21 172,874 210,005 12 9 332,934 49,945 
Total 21 172,874 210,005 12 9 332.934 49.945 
2015 
A 2 29,405,676 177,270 1 1 6,944 29,576,002 
C 19 345,115 239,016 11 8 231,078 353,053 
Total 21 29,750,791 416,286 12 9 238,022 29,929,055 
2016 
B 1 1,244,611 0 1 0 1,244,611 0 
C 18 50,281 102,734 5 13 57,797 95,218 
Total 19 1,294,892 102,734 6 13 1,302,408 95,218 
2017 
B 1 1,140,191 84,520 1 0 0 1,224,711 
C 13 483,320 336,491 6 7 293,432 526,379 
Total 14 1,623,511 421,011 7 7 293,432 1,751,090 
2018 
A 1 6,325,581 0 1 0 6,325,581 0 
B 2 2,584,660 84,794 1 1 1,619,163 1,050,291 
C 31 57,752 121,908 11 20 87,614 92,046 
Total 34 8,967,993 206,702 13 21 8,032,358 1,142,337 
Total (2009-2018) 219 52,929,980 1,890,480 108 111 20,974,786 33,845,674 
Source: Author’s own work according to SŽDC (2009 – 2019) 
In the years 2009 – 2018 there happened in total 219 occurrences caused by human factor on railway lines 
equipped with control and signaling equipment of safety levels 1 and 2. 108 of them were caused due to wrong 
operation of the infrastructure signaling system basically by train dispatcher or signaler and 111 due to bad vigilance 
of the train driver of the vehicle. With regard to the three groups of severity, the following statements can be made:   
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 Category A – serious accidents: 4 occurrences (3 infrastructure-mounted, 1 vehicle-mounted), 
 Category B – accidents: 7 occurrences (6 infrastructure-mounted, 1 vehicle-mounted), 
 Category C – incidents: 208 occurrences (99 infrastructure-mounted, 109 vehicle-mounted). 
 
The monetary overall damage (excluding socio-economic impacts) amounts to 54.820.460 CZK (of which 
20.974.786 CZK caused due to wrong operation of the infrastructure signaling system and 33.845.674 CZK due to 
bad vigilance of the train driver of the vehicle). 
6. Conclusions 
The subject of the paper was to present partial results of the research project “EVARAIL” focused on the 
evaluation of benefits associated with the (theoretical) improvement of railway control and signaling equipment of 
categories 1 and 2 of the state railway infrastructure in the Czech Republic. Specifically, the paper focuses on the 
analysis of the database of occurrences, which includes detailed characteristics of occurrences on the state railway 
infrastructure of the Czech Republic for the period 2009 – 2018. The aim of the analysis was to verify the 
applicability of data for further research activities. 
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